1. Introduction
There is a particular kind of alarm that does not arrive all at once. It builds, instead, across a decade of surveillance bulletins and case reports, until — almost without anyone deciding it should — the accumulated numbers themselves become the warning. Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) belongs to that category of crisis. It rarely produces the single dramatic image that mobilizes public attention, and yet its long-run consequences may be graver than those of many diseases that do, because AMR does not threaten one illness so much as it threatens a working assumption that sits underneath most of modern medicine: that a bacterial infection, once identified, can usually be treated. That assumption is eroding faster, it seems, than most health systems have managed to adapt to (Alem, 2025; Wahnou et al., 2026).
The scale involved is not easy to hold in mind all at once. In 2019, bacterial AMR was directly responsible for an estimated 1.27 million deaths, and was associated with nearly 4.95 million deaths when contributory cases are included (Hussain et al., 2025; Mudenda et al., 2025). Projections beyond that point are, frankly, unsettling — several analyses suggest that, absent meaningful intervention, annual AMR mortality could approach 10 million by 2050, a figure that would place resistant infection among the leading causes of death globally, ahead of cancer in some models (Abavisani et al., 2024; Millar et al., 2026). Whether that particular projection holds is, admittedly, uncertain; long-range mortality forecasting of this kind carries real methodological caveats. Still, even a fraction of that trajectory would represent a structural threat to global health security rather than a narrow microbiological concern.
The economic picture compounds the human one, if perhaps less viscerally. Estimates of the annual global GDP loss attributable to AMR span roughly $1 trillion to $3.4 trillion (Alem, 2025) — a wide range, reflecting genuine scientific uncertainty, but one that is, in every version, large enough to represent a serious drain on already-strained health systems. Recent surveillance data give little reason for optimism. The World Health Organization's 2025 Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) report, drawing on more than 23 million bacteriologically confirmed infections across over 100 countries, found that roughly one in six laboratory-confirmed bacterial infections was resistant to at least one frontline antibiotic (Wahnou et al., 2026). One in six. Read slowly, that statistic reframes the conversation somewhat: resistance is no longer confined to intensive care units or specialist referral centers; it is embedded, more or less, in ordinary clinical practice wherever clinicians look for it.
How the situation arrived here is less a single event than the cumulative outcome of decades of selective pressure applied simultaneously across human medicine, veterinary care, aquaculture, and industrial agriculture (Cunha-Ferreira et al., 2025; Mudenda et al., 2025). Prescribing habits are part of the story — audits suggest that up to half of clinical antibiotic prescriptions are unnecessary or inappropriate in some form (Alem, 2025) — and in many low- and middle-income countries, antibiotics remain available without prescription, loosening whatever restraint formal stewardship programs might otherwise provide. Livestock production adds a further, uncomfortable layer: antibiotics are still used extensively as feed additives and blanket prophylactics, and somewhere between 30% and 90% of the administered dose, depending on compound and animal system, passes through unmetabolized into manure, soil, and waterways (Alem, 2025).
Once in the environment, these subinhibitory residues rarely act in isolation. They combine with heavy metals and industrial biocides to sustain low-grade selective pressure across whole microbial communities (Alem, 2025; Solanki & Kumar Das, 2024), pushing environmental microbiomes into sustained contact with clinically significant pathogens — contact in which resistance genes move. The ESKAPE pathogens have, in this sense, become something like a living reservoir, trading resistance determinants with environmental bacteria and assembling what several authors now describe as an increasingly pan-resistant global resistome (Solanki & Kumar Das, 2024; Wahnou et al., 2026).
Against this backdrop, and alongside a rapidly maturing computational toolkit for detection, this review examines the molecular basis of last-resort antibiotic resistance, its ecological dissemination, and the emerging role of AI-based surveillance in narrowing the gap between when resistance emerges and when it is recognized.

